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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MINNIE PEARL DALTON, as Ad-
ministratrix of the Estate of James 
F. Dalton, deceased, and MINNIE 
PEARL D .. A.LTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
MAX DALTON, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8568 
Plaintiff and ap·pellant in her brief refers to the 
parties as in the lower court and for uniformity we will 
do so also. The statement of the case as set forth in 
appellant's brief is substantially correct. We do, how-
ever, c.all attention to the fact that by leave of court both 
the complaint and answer were amended just prior to 
the trial of the issues (Tr. 3). These amendments made 
Minnie Pearl Dalton, individually, a party plaintiff and 
allowed the defendants to set up Section 78-12-5 .and 
6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; and Estoppel as defenses 
to the action. 
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STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DECEASED, JAMES 
F. DALTON AND HIS WIFE, MINNIE PEARL DALTON, 
EXECUTED THE WARRANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER 27, 
1930 (DEF. E'X. 1) TO DANIEL PERKINS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
ESCROW AGREEMENT (DEF'S. EX. 2) HAD BEEN COM-
PLIED WITH AND THAT THE WARRANTY DEED DATED 
OCTOBER 27, 1930 EXECUTED BY JAMES F. DALTON 
AND MINNIE PEARL DALTON, GRANTORS, AND LEFT 
IN ESCROW \VITH THE SAN JUAN STATE BANK HAD 
BEEN VALIDLY DELIVERED. 
POINT III. 
THAT 'THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT, :rtiAX DALTON, HAD ACQUIRED TITLE 
TO THE PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF ADVERSE POSSES-
SION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DECEASED, JAMES 
F. DALTON AND HIS WIFE, MINNIE PEARL DALTON, 
EXECUTED THE WARRANTY DEED DATED OCTOBER 27, 
1930 (DEF. EX. 1) TO DANIEL PERKINS. 
The evidence is sufficient to support the court's 
finding that both Ja1nes F. Dalton and his \vife, ~finnie 
Pearl Dalton signed and executed the \Yarranty deed 
dated October 27, 1930, (DEF. Ex. 1). 
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3 
Mr. I-Ialls, a witness for the defendants testified 
. ' 
that he had lived in Monticello since 1915 (Tr. 28) and 
that he became a.cqu.ainted \vith James F. Dalton soon 
after he, (1Ir. Halls) n1oved to l\1onticello and that he 
\vas acquainted with Minnie Pearl Dalton and that he 
Y{US a notary public on the 28th day of October, 1930 
(Tr. 29), and that it was his signature on defendant's 
Exhibit 1 ( Tr. 30). He further testified that the deed 
\vas signed in his presence as a notary public (Tr. 30) 
and that aside from the formality of notarization he 
was personally acquainted \vith James F. Dalton's signa-
ture and that it was his signature (Tr. 31). As to Minnie 
Pearl D.alton's signature he stated that he knew it was 
her signature because he had acknowledged it. 
Appellant makes much of the point that Mr. Halls 
did not remen1ber the circumstances of the signing. We 
submit that he was telling the truth. He testified a.s to 
his practice as a notary public as follows: 
"Q. The Court, don't talk what every other 
notary does. You tell what your practice was." 
"A. Require them to be the-re and sign. If I 
ever took an acknowledgment in absence I don't 
remember that time." (Tr. 36). 
We further submit that if Mr. Halls h.ad testified 
that he remembered the circumstances, after a period 
of 26 years had elapsed, his veracity and credibility 
might "\Vell have been questioned. It is doubtful that any 
notary would remember such circumstances .after such 
a lapse of time. 
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While it is true that the instrument (Def. Ex. 1) 
recited that the Daltons were residents of Cortez, Monte-
zuma County, Colorado, the acknowledgment is in due 
fonn for San Juan County, State of Utah. There wa.." 
testimony that the D.alton family had lived in Mancos, 
Colorado, (Tr. 25, 83) in the spring and fall of 1931. 
Mancos is in ~fontezuma County, Colorado. 
Appellant refers to defendants' Exhibit 2 which is 
a copy of a letter addressed to the State Bank of San 
Juan, Monticello, Utah, dated October 27, 1930 and 
urges that from the fact that the acknowledgment is 
dated Octobe·r 28, 1930, that the signatures were on 
the deed before ~t was presented to ~fr. Halls for 
acknowledgment. This is rank speculation and has no 
foundation in f.act. It should be noted here that the 
deed was typed in its entirety except for signatures 
and that there is nothing in the record to show ·w·hen 
it was actually delivered in escro\Y to the bank. There 
is also nothing in the record to indicate \Vhen, where 
and by whom said deed was prepared. 
We do not agree tltat any point can be made of 
the fact that the Appellant, 1\frs. Dalton, did not sign 
the escrow agree1nent with the bank. In view of the fact 
that the deed bearing both signatures \Vas in fact de-
livered to the bank, it 'va.s not necess.ary for ~Irs. Dalton 
to sign the agree1nent in order to create a valid escro\v. 
As to the 'veight to be giYen . to the testilnony of 
appPllant, J\{innie Pearl Dalton, on these matters, we call 
attention to the transcript of her testimony on cross 
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examin.ation beginning on Page 12 when her affidavit 
of prejudice (DEF'S Ex. 3.) was presented to her. 
While the exhibit is not dated, it was apparently signed 
by her on or about the last of November, 1955, and a 
copy sent to counsel for defendant on December 5, 1955. 
She testified as follows : 
"Q. You recognize your signature Mrs. Dal-
ton, is it or is it not your signature~" 
"A. I don't think so, I don't think I have 
seen it before ... " (Tr. 12). 
Even her own counsel became non-plussed by her 
obvious attempt to cover up the facts and his effort to 
correct her testimony on redirect examination as con-
tained in the transcript on Pages 14 and 15, .and finally 
her admission that she signed a paper in Mr. Flanders' 
Office, is most revealing. On recross examination, she 
finally admitted that the signature on the affidavit 
of prejudice was hers (Tr. 27). 
Appellant's brief is completely silent on the testi-
mony of Sam F. Parry, a witness for the defendants. 
Mr. Parry had been a banker since 1943 during which 
time he had become well acquainted with signature com-
parison. He was a completely disinterested witness and 
not acquainted with any of the partie.s to the action. 
(Tr. 61 and 62). Defendants' Exhibit 1, the deed, and 
defendants' Exhibit 3, the known signature on the affi-
davit of Prejudice, were presented to him and his testi-
Inony was .as follo,vs : 
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"Q. Do you have an op1rnon as to whether 
those two signatures were written by the same 
person," The Court, "Answer yes or no, as to 
whether you have an opinion." 
"A. Y e.s, my opinion is that ... 
"A. My opinion is that the signatures were 
written by the same person." 
"Q. The Court: Now, there are two signa-
tures on the one document, which name do you 
refer to, Maggie Pe.arl Dalton~" 
"A. "The Minnie Pearl Dalton." 
"Q. Will you state what you base your 
opinion upon, Mr. Parry~" 
"A. The fonn of the handwriting is very 
similar. There is no evidence of tracing on either 
document. The dots above the i's are more in 
the fonn of a small line, rather than .a dot. This 
irregularity appears on both documents. The form 
of the handwriting doe.sn't indicate hesitancy in 
the signature, particularly indicates that the per-
son is in the habit of signing in this manner. 
The break in the final word "Dalton" shows that 
the pen was lifted between the '~t" and the "o" 
in both instances. There is a slight left swing at 
the end of the word "\Yhich more or less vvould be 
an involuntary action in the signature and it 
appears in both." (Tr. 64 and 65). 
We sub1nit that in vie'Y of the testimony of J.Ir. 
Halls both personally and as a notary public.; and the 
analysis of the signature of nirs. Dalton by ~lr. Parry; 
and in view of the reluctance of ~Irs. D.alton to be forth-
rjght about her action 'vith respect to her know11 signa-
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ture; and a close analysis of the signatures on all the 
documents; leads to the inescapable conclu.sion that both 
:ilfr. and Mrs. D.alton, in fact, signed the deed as the 
lower court held. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 'THAT THE 
ESCROW AGREElVIENT (DEF'S. EX. 2) HAD BEEN COl\1-
PLIED WITH AND THAT THE WARRANTY DEED DATED 
OCTOBER 27, 1930 EXECUTED BY JAMES F. DALTON 
AND MINNIE PEARL DALTON, GRA.NTORS, AND LEFT 
IN ESCROW WITH THE SAN JUAN STATE BANK HAD 
BEEN VALIDLY DELIVERED. 
It is the contention of the respondents that there 
vvas ample evidence of an escrow contract and agree-
Inent between James F. Dalton and the bank and Perkins 
Brothers, by the terms of which it would have been 
paid out in full at the end of seven ye.a.rs or in approxi-
mately the year 1934. (DEF 'S :B~x. 2). 
In his instructions to the Bank as escrow holder, 
nfr. Dalton acknowledged receipt of part of the consider-
ation of the agreement dated June 1, 1927, which was a 
part of the entire document. It is to be noted that Perkins 
Brothers were to p.ay all taxes as they became due. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit D sho'\\rs that all taxes from the year 
1930 to 1941 were paid by the Perkins or their agents 
and that the defendant, ~1ax Dalton, paid the taxes 
from 1942 to 1955, inclusive. 
Unfortunately, those who knew all the f.acts re-
garding the entire transaction are no longer available. 
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Of necessity, we are now forced to draw certain con-
clusions from the known facts. It must be presumed 
that th~ bank, as escrow holder, carried out the instruc-
tions contained in the letter of escrow and that upon 
completion of the terms therein contained, the papers, 
including the deed, were turned over to H. C. Perkins 
by the bank, from the fact that they were ultimatelv 
.., 
found in the probate file of the H. C. Perkins estate. 
Otherwise, th·ey would have been turned back to James 
F. Dalton or his family. 
In 30 C.J.S. Para. 18 Page 1222 under Escrows, 
we find under the heading of Evidence that: 
"Where an instrument deposited as an escro"r 
is found in the possession of the party for whom 
it was intended, it is presumed to have been 
delivered properly." (Citing Clements v. Hood 57 
Ala. 459; and Firemen's In.s. Co. v. l\1cMillan. 29 
Ala. 147). 
We submit that Donald Adams, as attorney for the 
Administrator, was not a third party or a stranger to 
the transaction in the sense that the tern1 is used in 
the c.ases cited by appellant. We call attention to defend-
ants' Exhibit 5 which is the abstract of title on the real 
estate involved in this case. The entry beginning on 
Page 13 is a decree of settle1nent in the pro hate of the 
estate of Hyrum C. Perkins, deceased, dated April 21, 
1942, wherein the real estate involved in this case \vas 
distributed to his heirs. Plaintiff's Exhibit D is a state-
ment of the tax record for the years 1930 to 1955, in-
clusive, and shows that the taxes against said real e·state 
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were assessed in the name of the H. C. Perkins estate 
:from 1943 to 1948 and assessed in the name of the de-
fendant, Max Dalton from 1949 to 1955, inclusive. ~fax 
Dalton recorded his deed on November 5, 1948, (DEF'S 
Ex. 5, abstract I~ntry No. 15). 
The evidence shows that the record title for the 
entire period of thirteen years from 1942 to 1955, in-
clusive, was in the heirs of H. C. Perkins and ~iax 
Dalton, and that the taxes were paid for the entire period 
by Max Dalton. In addition to paying all the taxes he 
was in the exclusive, open and notorious possession of 
said premise.s and. used said premises in the usual man-
ner, namely, that of grazing, all during said period4 
vVhile it is true that the deed from Minnie Pearl Dalton 
.and James F. Dalton dated October 27, 1930 to Daniel 
Perkins vv-as not recorded until November 5, 1948, it is 
reasonable to asstune that the deed vvas in possession 
and control of the heirs of the grantee and had been for 
Horne years prior thereto, othervvise, the real estate would 
not have been included in the assets of the estate of Hy-
runl Perkins. In view of these facts, the actual delivery 
of the deed by 1fr. Adams as attorney for the Adminis-
trators of the estate to Max Dalton and the recording 
of it was routine .and its importance to the case of appel-
lants becomes insignificant. 
Vol. 26A of CJS P·ara. 183, Page 14 on Delivery of 
Deeds states: 
"The delivery of a deed may be presumed 
after the lapS'e of many ye.ars, especially where 
the parties are dead and the grantee's possession 
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of the property has been undisputed." ... "When 
the circumstances are such to give rise to a pre-
sumption of delivery, the presumption is rebut-
table, and the burden of overcoming such pre-
sumption rests on the person who denies delivery.'' 
Vol. 26A of c·Js Para. 204, Sec. C, Page 78: 
"While the fact that a dee·d duly executed 
appears of record is not ordinarily conclusive 
proof of its delivery, th·e fact that such recorda-
tion is some evidence of its delivery, 'vhich, in 
the absence of rebutting evidence, or in connection 
with other circun1stances showing an intention to 
deliver, rnay be _sufficient to establish a delivery 
... Delay ,in recording does not negative delivery;'' 
(Italics ours) 
(G) "The presumption arising from posses-
sion of the deed by the grantee ... may be over-
come only by the most satisfactory evidence, by 
counter evidence of superior weight or by clear 
and convincing evidence." 
Appellants have not carried this burden of proof. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the probate file 'v.as 
a public record and the further fact that the taxes were 
paid by Perkins and Dalton and that Perkins and D.alton 
were in possession of said property, all of 'vhich n1ust 
be deemed to have given appellants _notice of their ad-
verse claim, Jatnes F. Dalton and after his death, his 
heirs, did nothing 'vhatsoeYer about said property until 
many years late-r. They left it from 1926 until 1955 at 
which time they returned to take possession of it. (Tr. 
7 and 8). The only explanation of rec.ord as to their 
re.af;on for non-artivity in asserting title against re-
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spondents, and their predecessors in interest, is the 
statement that from 1927 to 1942 the Perkins Brothers 
were their agent.s and were to pay the taxes on the 
place. (Tr. 24). Letters of Administration in the· estate 
of James F. Dalton were not obtained until June 9, 1955, 
over ten years after his de.ath. If appellant and her 
children seriously believed they had ownership rights in 
the property they would not have delayed so long in 
asserting them. The record of this case is entirely 
silent as to their explanation of inactivity or non-posses-
sion for the years 1942 to 1955, inclusive, and which 
period of time becomes extremely important as to the 
applicability of Sections 78-12-5; 78-12-6; 78-12-7; 78-
12-8; 78-12-9; 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
POINT III. 
THA'T THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT, MAX DALTON, HAD ACQUIRED TITLE 
TO THE PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF ADVERSE POSSES-
SION. 
The lower court found as follo,vs: 
"11. Neither of the plaintiffs nor any agent, 
tenant or employee of the plaintiffs has been in 
actual possession of the property involved herein 
at any time since October 28, 1930." (Finding of 
Fact No. 11.) 
The court reached the following conclusion: 
"That the plaintiffs, Minnie Pearl Dalton, 
Administratrix of the Estate of James F. Dalton, 
deceased, and Minnie Pearl Dalton in her own 
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right ·as surviving wife of James F. Dalton and 
. ·?therwise are each barred from claiming said 
real esiate or any right therein by reason of the 
facts set· forth and by reason of the provisions of 
· 'Sections 78,..12-5; 78-12-6; 78-12-7; 78-12-8; 78-12-9; 
78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953." (Con-
clusion of Law No. 2.) 
Both this Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
are supported by the evidence in this C'ase. The record 
is devoid of any evidence which would entitle the appel-
lant to prevail in this aetion. Certainly, the burden of 
proof was upon her to establish her case and to bring it 
within the exception of Section 78-12-5, lTtah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which provides as follow.s: 
SEIZURE OR POSSESSION WITHIN 
SEVEN YEARS NE·C·ESSARY 
"No action for the recovery of real property 
or for the posse.ssion thereof shall be maintained, 
unless it appears that the pl~arntiff, his ancestors, 
grantor or predecessor was seized or possessed 
of the property in question within seven years 
before the commencement of the action." 
This she failed to do. 
Vol. 26A of CJS, Para. 202, Page 69, correctly states 
our position in this case : 
"Title to real property resting on warranty 
deeds of record, follo\ved by open and notorious 
occupation and assertion of title, should not be 
easily and reradily disturbed, especially where the 
attempt to overthro'v such title is made after the 
death of the party most vitally interested therein.'' 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and the Decree as entered in this 
case are all amply supported by the evidence and that the 
lower court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ADAMS, PETERSON & ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
200 Bank Building 
Monticello, Utah 
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